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The fiscal compact – Europe’s ‘hard core’ 
based on German economic conditions
Konrad Popławski
On 2 March, the leaders of 25 EU member states signed the Treaty on sta-
bility, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union. 
It will introduce new fiscal constraints and officially vest new competences 
in the eurozone countries. Thus, their right to coordinate economic policy 
among them will be sanctioned. So far, the Lisbon Treaty has only provided 
for organisation of informal Eurogroup meetings, to be attended by repre-
sentatives of the European Commission. The principles introduced by the 
compact, if the eurozone countries are really determined to observe its pro-
visions, will create a new way of managing the single currency. Within the 
next few years, the most indebted countries will have to carry out radical 
reforms to boost their competitiveness and adjust it to German standards. 
During this period the Federal Republic of Germany will most probably 
decide to offer higher loan guarantees to relieve these countries’ budgets. 
The compact’s political consequences are also of great significance, espe-
cially considering how the treaty was finalised. The eurozone states have in 
fact accepted that the direction for changes will be devised by France and 
Germany, and the role of European institutions such as the Commission 
or the Parliament may weaken. From the perspective of eurozone candi-
date countries, the introduction of the fiscal compact means expanding the 
scope of conditions they must meet to become members of the single cur-
rency area. In the future, a country, in order to adopt the single currency, 
will have to meet the structural deficit criterion, and also most probably 
carry out economic reforms such as unifying its fiscal system. These goals 
will be achieved across the eurozone gradually, in the subsequent stages 
of the economic governance reform. 
The compact’s final version and the context of its introduction
The leaders of 25 European Union member states, the United Kingdom and the Czech 
Republic excluded, have agreed to sign the fiscal compact pushed through by Germany. 
Under this compact, the eurozone states will be obliged to keep their structural deficit (which 
does not include one-time expenses and expenses related to excess unemployment figures) 
at a level not exceeding 0.5% of GDP. Only in the case of a serious economic slump caused 
by external factors can this obligation be bypassed. The new balanced budget rule is to be 
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incorporated into the legal system of each of these countries. If any of the states fails to 
introduce this clause, any other state can bring a case to the European Court of Justice, 
which will be entitled to impose a penalty on such a state amounting to 0.1% of GDP. 
Furthermore, the agreement incorporates into the legal system an obligation upon eurozone 
states to meet at least twice a year (so far the summits where important decisions relating 
to the whole EU were made have been informal). If at least 12 states ratify the compact, 
it will come into force on 1 January 2013. 
The non-eurozone countries were also allowed to join the fiscal compact. If they do so, they 
will be able to attend some of the eurozone meetings devoted to “the euro area’s competi-
tiveness, and modifying its general architecture & the fundamental rules that will apply to it 
in the future”. This, however, is more of a political declaration of support for the eurozone, 
as it will not be necessary for the non-single currency countries to meet the structural deficit 
requirement. The rather unclear wording of the clause relating to the subject matter of the 
summits to be attended by non-eurozone countries may turn the matter of inviting them to 
key meetings into one element of a political game. For example, France’s President Nicolas 
Sarkozy has claimed that the non-eurozone states will be invited only to the Euro Plus group 
meetings, which are debates devoted to boosting the eurozone’s competitiveness.
Unlike in the draft adopted in December 
2011, in the fiscal compact’s final version 
the clauses concerning fiscal obligations 
were moderated, and the possibility of by-
passing them in extraordinary economic 
circumstances was introduced. Further-
more, Germany has dropped its proposal 
to incorporate the compact’s provisions 
into the constitution, as this could disable 
the ratification process in some states, for example in Ireland, where a referendum would 
be necessary. Despite these adjustments, Ireland has already announced that a ballot is 
unavoidable. In the final version, the title of the document was also changed from the 
original ‘International agreement on a reinforced economic union’ to the ‘Treaty on stability, 
coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union’, probably to highlight 
the agreement’s importance, especially in relation to EU treaties. A provision was added to 
the final version of the compact stating that within five years of the date of its coming into 
force, the necessary steps shall be taken to incorporate its substance into the legal frame-
work of the European Union. 
The fiscal compact’s political significance
The fiscal compact is an important document which will initiate the process of building 
the monetary union’s political dimension. The French concept, on the basis of which it was 
assumed in the early 1990s that the introduction of the single currency would give an impe-
tus for the automatic creation of a political union, has proved wrong1. Over the last decade 
the single currency states have made little progress in this area, and it was only the scale 
of the eurozone debt crisis that forced them to deepen their cooperation. 
The way in which the fiscal compact was adopted demonstrated the growing position of 
Germany in Europe, as most of the proposals included in it were submitted by Germany. 
From the French perspective, the goal of limiting the debate on the eurozone to the group 
of countries which use the single currency was attained, as according to the country’s elit-
es the exclusion of Central Europe and the United Kingdom increases the political chances 
of pushing through the solutions proposed by France, mainly by way of negotiations with 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 In the 1990s, the dispute 
over the creation of political 
institutions to facilitate the 
governance of the monetary 
union was a major bone of 
contention between Germany 
and France. At that time, the 
Germans believed that one of 
the main weaknesses of the 
Treaties of Maastricht and Am-
sterdam was that they failed to 
establish foundations for a po-
litical union to guarantee joint 
coordination of the eurozone’s 
governance.
The rather unclear wording of the 
clause relating to the subject matter 
of the summits to be attended by non-
eurozone countries may turn the mat-
ter of inviting them to key meetings 
into one element of a political game.
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Germany. France considers it a success that Germany was persuaded of the need for 
deeper integration in the eurozone. So far Germany has avoided any debates on this, fearing 
that the European Union might split, but most importantly that the German social market 
economy model – which it considers exemplary – might be reviewed. From the perspective 
of these two states, it seems favourable to isolate the institutional reform of the eurozone 
from the institutional agenda of EU treaties, as this would accelerate and simplify the 
decision-making process and limit the role of EU institutions. 
It seems that it was not exclusively the persuasive strategy of France that induced Ger-
many to change the integration concept in the immediate future. Apparently the German 
elites have come to approve of integration within the ‘hard core’. The first sign of such 
a change in the German thinking was the introduction in 2007 of a provision to the Lisbon 
Treaty concerning enhanced cooperation in selected areas among the interested states. 
The United Kingdom’s veto on the incorporation of the compact into European treaties 
proved a favourable pretext for Germany to abandon the concept of European integration 
across the whole EU, which had hitherto been officially promoted, in favour of deepening 
cooperation within the ‘hard core’2. 
Equally significant was the fact that consent to limit integration to the group of eurozone 
states might facilitate the re-election of Nicolas Sarkozy as President of France, as Germany 
fears that victory for a socialist candidate 
in the French presidential elections could 
lead to tension in relations between Paris 
and Berlin and disable the eurozone re-
forms. Germany’s ruling coalition politi-
cians would also welcome a victory for 
Sarkozy because he would accept Ger-
many’s dominant position in the eurozone, and would be ready to carry out reforms in 
France based on the German model, aware of a growing economic disparity which is 
shifting in Germany’s favour. 
Another argument in favour of the return to the concept of the ‘hard core’ was that Germany 
was persuaded that the Lisbon Treaty was ineffective and inappropriate for the problems 
faced by the eurozone. From the perspective of the current crisis, it is evident that the Treaty 
has failed to introduce sufficient powers to enable more efficient governance of the single 
currency. Furthermore, the voice of the Federal Republic of Germany on the EU agenda is 
still too weak to push through the country’s major proposals, as evidenced by the fact that 
even the so-called ‘Six-pack’ (a package of six reforms to economic governance in the EU) 
has failed to introduce a fully automatic method of imposing sanctions for excess budget 
deficit. Furthermore, the law-making procedures based on the rules provided for in the 
Lisbon Treaty are too lengthy, and have not kept pace with developments resulting from 
the eurozone crisis and the corresponding reactions on the financial markets.
Marginalising EU institutions – 
a stop-gap measure or a long-term strategy?
The way in which the fiscal compact was adopted has demonstrated a certain marginalisa-
tion of the European institutions, whose role – according to the Lisbon Treaty – was sup-
posed to be significant. Neither the European Parliament nor the European Commission 
has had a major impact on the draft, and their role as specified in the compact’s provisions 
is merely symbolic. The process of drafting the document was no different from the deci-
sion-making process during the eurozone crisis, which has now been going on for two years. 
Therefore, had the United Kingdom not vetoed the incorporation of the treaty into the EU’s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Germany has returned to 
the concepts it had been 
considering in the mid-1990s, 
when various strategies for 
deepening integration within 
Europe’s ‘hard core’ were be-
ing analysed. It was only the 
German priority of enlarging 
the EU eastward that set those 
ambitions aside at that time. 
As early as then, Europe’s 
‘hard core’ was to be based 
on those states which had 
the strongest connections with 
Germany, mainly the Benelux 
countries and France.
The fiscal compact is an important 
document which will initiate the 
process of building the monetary 
union’s political dimension.
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legal framework in December 2011, the EU bodies would not have played any major role 
in negotiating its content anyway. Public opinion in numerous European countries is getting 
used to the new way in which the European Community functions, and so there were no 
protests even last December, when France and Germany announced the compact’s main 
framework at the summit. This was considerably different from the situation in March 2011, 
when France and Germany were heavily criticised by most European countries for creating 
the basis for the Euro-Plus Pact, and originally the competitiveness pact, without consulting 
with their other partners. 
In Germany, the European Commission is generally perceived as a body which is inter-
fering with the process of healing the eurozone, and has no legitimacy to impose any 
solutions relating to the eurozone on the national governments. A relevant example here is 
the strong opposition towards most of the proposals submitted by the European Commis-
sion, including the one concerning Eurobonds. The attitude of the European Commission’s 
President was also repeatedly criticised, and his proposals were rejected as attempts to 
defend the Commission’s position in the EU. However, it is worth noting that the EU insti-
tutions’ competences have been expanded in certain areas. The compact has confirmed 
the European Commission’s role in imposing EU sanctions for breaching the 3% budget 
deficit limit. Its decision to penalise a country can only be vetoed by qualified majority vot-
ing. This shows that despite its scepticism towards the European Commission’s political 
importance, Germany sees it as a guardian of EU law and does not intend to weaken this 
role. This is why Germany will strongly support the European Commission in enforcing the 
macroeconomic and fiscal balance provisions, as it wants to avoid repeating the current 
economic problems. The so-called ‘budget brake’3 will be a strong motivation even for fed-
eral governments headed by future ruling coalitions. The consent of German public opinion 
to the need to implement this objective will induce the federal government to push through 
the obligation to observe the budget rules 
across the eurozone.
Initiatives to be undertaken in the eurozone 
in the near future will show the relation 
between the eurozone and the remaining 
EU member states. There is a risk that the 
fiscal compact might be used as an instrument to establish law for the whole community. 
An example of such an action could be the announced proposal to introduce a tax on finan-
cial transactions. It will also be binding on financial institutions based in the non-eurozone 
EU states which carry out most of their transactions in cooperation with entities based in the 
single currency area. So, if the decision on this matter is taken unilaterally by the eurozone 
states without appropriate consultations with the remaining partners, it could be considered 
an attempt to push through projects of considerable importance for the whole European 
Union in the eurozone first, and to force the other EU member states to implement relevant 
adjustments. In the long term, this situation could accelerate the marginalisation of the 
European institutions, or cause a partial delegation of their administrative competences to 
the individual eurozone countries. 
Still, it is possible that German support for non-treaty based reforms of the eurozone is the 
right solution for this time of crisis. In the longer term, the EU’s institutions can be useful 
in implementing Berlin’s most important goals in such areas as energy and climate policy, 
and in deepening economic integration and commercial relations. This is why in the next 
few years Germany can concentrate on the eurozone reforms, and try to highlight the im-
portance of the whole EU by drawing attention to the great importance of the European 
institutions, keeping the EU budget relatively high, and emphasising a policy of cohesion. 
Germany might fear that excessive emancipation of the eurozone from the EU institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Incorporated into the German 
constitution as of 2009, this 
constitutes an obligation to 
keep the structural deficit 
in Germany at a level not 
exceeding 0.35% of GDP 
as of 2016.There is a risk that the fiscal compact 
might be used as an instrument to 
establish law for the whole community. 
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might discourage the Central European countries from developing their integration with 
the eurozone and encourage to adopt a more assertive policy, and block important projects 
proposed by Germany within the EU, such as the common climate and energy policy. 
This could also limit the benefits Germany has derived from the EU’s enlargement4. 
The fiscal compact’s economic importance
The new compact is intended to restore fiscal discipline. In practice, its introduction means 
that those national governments which are in breach of the new discipline rules will be held 
accountable before national bodies. It is difficult as yet to assess how effective this solution 
will be. If the principle proposed by Germany proves enforceable, the single-currency states, 
in particular the less competitive ones, will have to carry out deep structural reforms – not only 
to curb their expenses, but also to change the functioning of their social systems and labour 
markets. Signing the compact will mean a de facto agreement that most countries – such as 
Spain, Portugal, Italy or even France – would have to adjust their systems to the German eco-
nomic model; that would mean these states would incur most of the costs of such a transfor-
mation. In practice, this would mean the necessity to control expenses even in good economic 
conditions, when the debt financing costs 
are usually much lower. The structural defi-
cit limit is defined so as to allow for slightly 
higher deficits in less favourable economic 
circumstances, and to keep the deficit low 
in good economic conditions.
It is uncertain whether the reforms pro-
posed by Germany and France would en-
able the southern eurozone countries to 
regain their competitiveness. So far, their participation in the single currency project has 
led to a growing disparity in their balance of payments. In these states, which are deprived 
of the ability to weaken their respective currencies, imports have risen much faster than 
exports, which during the crisis period has led to a rapid and significant increase in their 
foreign debt5. 
In the foreseeable future, both Germany and France will most probably call not only for 
spending cuts, but also for income reforms, possibly by formulating proposals for the unify-
ing the method of calculating the tax to be collected from businesses. Both countries believe 
that so far, due to the CIT rate being too low, some states (Ireland in particular) have been 
competing unfairly with others. In February 2012 Berlin and Paris announced a plan to 
harmonise tax systems in their countries, so a proposal calling for a similar reform in the 
eurozone is very likely. Furthermore, incentives to reform the labour markets according to 
the German model are to be expected. In 2004–2005 Germany introduced the following 
modifications: temporary forms of employment have been made more flexible, unemploy-
ment benefits have been reduced and the retirement age lifted. However, it is hard to assess 
whether any of these solutions could be successfully applied in other eurozone countries.
The example of Greece has shown German politicians that savings alone can magnify the 
scale of a country’s economic problems. This is why Germany has suggested transferring 
some of the money from structural funds to support programmes aimed at reducing unem-
ployment among youth and young adults, with the intention of showing their readiness to 
offer investment aid to those southern countries which are striving to modernise their econo-
mies. Considering that Germany will not be willing to offer more funds to support investments 
in the eurozone’s weakest countries, it may want to increase payouts from the structural 
funds for those countries, at the expense of funds contracted for Central Europe. 
 
4 In 2010, the Vysegrad Group 
states alone purchased Ger-
man goods worth of €87.2 
billion, comparable with the 
value of the German export to 
France (€89.5 billion), Ger-
many’s largest trade partner. 
The total value of import from 
those countries (€81.9 billion) 
was higher than the respective 
figures for imports from China 
(€77.3 billion), the German 
market’s largest supplier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 This has also contributed to 
a rise in the unemployment 
rate, as the goods consumed 
in these countries had been 
manufactured abroad. This 
is one reason why German 
unemployment figures are at 
a 30-year low. In the 1990s, 
before monetary union was 
established, the opposite 
situation prevailed, due to 
the foreign exchange policy 
adopted by Germany’s trade 
partners among other reasons. 
Germany’s current account 
was much lower, and conse-
quently, its unemployment rate 
was convergent with the EU 
average.
Signing the compact will mean 
a de facto agreement that most 
countries – such as Spain, Portugal, 
Italy or even France – would have to 
adjust their systems to the German 
economic model.
i s s u e  7 1  |  0 7 . 0 3 . 2 0 1 2  |  c e N T R e  f O R  e A s T e R N  s T u d i e s
cOMMeNTARyOsw
OSW.WAW.PL 6
Germany’s rhetoric towards Greece6, as well as the compact’s provisions guaranteeing its 
coming into force after just 12 out of the 17 eurozone states sign it, may mean that Ber-
lin has growing doubts as to whether the fiscal situation in Greece can be remedied, and 
is ever more seriously considering the option of its controlled default. In January 2012, 
the Bundestag agreed to revive the bank aid fund which had existed in 2007–2010, and 
currently has €400 billion of financial guarantees at its disposal. According to press reports, 
a few weeks earlier Chancellor Angela Merkel met with the heads of Germany’s largest finan-
cial institutions to announce that they should start preparations for the possible insolvency 
of Greece. To secure the system against 
the consequences of Greece’s default, 
it would probably be necessary to increase 
the volume of the loans offered to the 
remaining eurozone states. An improve-
ment in the economic situation in Spain or 
Italy could convince the financial markets 
that there is no threat of default in any of 
the big eurozone states. However, it can-
not be ruled out that Greece remaining in 
the eurozone would be conditional on its 
accepting some form of supervision by EU institutions over its budget.
The savings in the eurozone could also exert pressure on the German economy, which de-
pends on exports to a large extent. In the context of the necessity to make savings imposed 
by the compact, which will additionally lead to public spending cuts and labour cost reduc-
tion in a number of the eurozone countries, this may cause a decline in the volume of German 
exports to the eurozone (which account for around 40% of the country’s total export). There-
fore, from the point of view of German business, the importance of other markets (includ-
ing Central Europe and the emerging economies) will grow. From the German perspective, 
the political significance of China, India and Brazil, whose rapid development might balance 
the expected decline in German trade within the eurozone, is likely to grow as well.
Opportunities and risks of implementing the fiscal compact 
One certain consequence of the pact’s signing is the launch of the process of creating a po-
litical union within the eurozone step by step. The eurozone has organised meetings devoted 
to coordinating economic policy within the monetary union since 2009, which was when 
the eurozone crisis worsened. However, the fiscal compact has expanded the competences 
of these summits and increased their political importance. The increased political pressure 
on the compact’s eurozone signatories will also result from public interest in the fiscal situ-
ation in these countries. So far, the lack of an institutional framework for these summits 
has been a problem for the eurozone. The states will remedy this by charging their national 
ministries with the task of drafting subsequent reforms, as evidenced by the cooperation 
between the French and German finance ministries in unifying their corporate tax laws. 
Any support offered by the EU institutions can in fact be blocked by the United Kingdom.
It is still uncertain whether the compact’s budgetary constraints will be maintained, and 
political pressure will continue to be an important condition of whether the eurozone sig-
natories will meet the compact’s requirements. Germany’s economic position within the 
eurozone has increased in times of the global crisis and its political power is stronger 
than a few years back, so pressure from it to stick to the compact’s provisions will grow. 
At the domestic level, Germany has incorporated the budget rule into its constitution and 
has been consequently carrying out spending reforms, so as to keep its structural deficit 
6 The new tone of the debate, 
and the radicalisation of the 
German position towards 
Greece, are evident in propos-
als such as creating a post 
of EU savings commissioner, 
who could be entitled to 
supervise the Greek domestic 
budget for a specific period, 
and veto any expenses which 
have not been consulted with 
international institutions. 
Germany’s proposal has been 
criticised by most of the other 
states, and has not become 
a subject for debate. 
Considering that Germany will not 
be willing to offer more funds to sup-
port investments in the eurozone’s 
weakest countries, it may want to 
increase payouts from the structural 
funds for those countries, 
at the expense of funds contracted 
for Central Europe.
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no higher than 0.35% of GPD as of 2016; this makes it very unlikely that Germany would 
ever again break the rules of the compact it has pushed through. If implemented, the fiscal 
compact’s economic principles as pushed through by Germany would mean subjecting the 
rules of the eurozone functioning to the German economic doctrine of a balanced budget. 
If the savings turn out to be too radical and the level of investment falls, the economic situ-
ation may worsen and the eurozone’s economic problems might deepen. In such a case, 
some of the eurozone members might not be able to keep to the compact’s rules, resulting 
in either their leaving the eurozone or a decline in the compact’s credibility.
Another important threat to the fiscal compact is its failure to consider the eurozone’s most 
significant problem, namely the scale of disparities among its members’ balances of pay-
ments. Due to their limited competitiveness with the northern economies, the monetary 
union’s southern states have had to increase their imports, which led to a sharp rise in 
their debt. There is a risk that in order to accelerate the reforms of the southern economies, 
Germany will agree to increase the volume of investments there from the structural funds, 
possibly at the expense of the Central European countries. On the other hand, Germany 
should expect a hostile reception in Cen-
tral Europe to such a solution, so the scale 
of any such budget shift should be rather 
limited. Otherwise this could squander the 
benefits of the EU enlargement of 2004, 
which so far has been economically very 
favourable for Germany. 
The fiscal compact does not introduce any 
significant new instruments, yet it can be 
considered an important political signal 
that the eurozone intends to integrate its members. This is evidenced by some states’ 
objections towards any deeper involvement of EU institutions, and to the participation of 
all EU member states in the eurozone meetings. France strongly supports basing any fur-
ther integration on the monetary union, which would allow the influence of Central Europe 
and the United Kingdom on decisions made within the eurozone, and also probably within 
the whole EU, to be limited. So far, it is difficult to assess whether Germany has been 
persuaded to adopt this method of political decision-making in the long-term perspective, 
or whether it intends to cooperate with France temporarily use the fiscal compact, in order 
to pursue their national political aims alone.
It is still uncertain whether 
the compact’s budgetary constraints 
will be maintained, and political 
pressure will continue to be 
an important condition of whether 
the eurozone signatories will meet 
the compact’s requirements. 
